Islamist mujahedeen in northern Mali

The situation along the demarcation line that separates Islamist-held northern Mali from the south of the country is agonizingly confusing.  The Malian army claim to have recaptured the strategic town of Douentza, while the Islamist claim the complete opposite. According their spokesperson, the bearded Sanda ould Boumama, the combined forces of AQIM, Ansar ud-Dine and MUJAO have pushed the Malian army back at least as far as the small town of Konna, if not further. Meanwhile France has mobilised some elite troops from a base in Chad and sent them to Sevaré, the town on the main east-west highway that serves as a transport hub for the Mopti region. The idea of Islamists capturing Mopti itself, Mali’s second largest city which is now dangerously close to the frontline, would be an A-grade nightmare not only for Mali but also for France and the international community. France has spent the last few months trying to persuade the US and the UN that need for action in northern Mali is urgent, without a great deal of success. There are also reports of an aerial bombardment of Konna although whether it was carried out by France or by Ukranian mercenaries isn’t entirely clear. The latest new from AFP, no more than two minutes old, is that the Malian army has counter-attacked, and no doubt hopes to retake Konna by night fall.

Talking of mercenaries, a local man from Konna reported that most of the Islamist fighters he encountered in the town were darker-skinned Songhai or Fulani. Some also clearly belonged to other black African nationalities; Nigerian, Guinean, Senegalese, Ivorian, even Bambara and Malinké from southern Mali. In terms of the ‘lower’ ranks at least, this is no longer a clear cut conflict between ‘white’ Arabs and Touareg from the northern deserts and ‘black’ Songhai, Peul, Bambara etc from regions further south. It has become a great deal more ‘asymmetrical’ than that, with black Africans fighting both for and against the Islamists. Some of the mujahedeen at Konna were also very young, no more than in their mid-teens, if that. The International Criminal Court in the Hague is going to be busy if and when this conflict ends.  My hunch is that the men who took Konna belong to the Ansar as-Sunna brigade, MUJAO’s recently formed unit designed to mobilize the local Songhai and Peul youth. Many of these young men will be from the Gao region and given the hitherto transparent will of the large majority of the city’s population to reunite with Mali at the earliest possible opportunity, the fact that they are now attacking the very country they purport to love so dearly indicates a severe case of either mass brain-washing or of desperate mercenary activity.

Meanwhile, the UN Security Council met in emergency session to “express their grave concern over the reported military movements and attacks by terrorist and extremist groups in the north of Mali, in particular their capture of the city of Konna, near Mopti,” according to a Security Council press statement.  The Council called for a rapid deployment of the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) and the immediate issuance of an agreed political road map, which includes serious negotiations with non-extremist Malians in the north and presses for the full restoration of democratic governance. It seems that the EU, UN and USA’s preferred option of a slow careful build-up to an invasion of the north by a Malian lead force of ECOWAS, AU and French Special Forces, with D Day set sometime next September and plenty of negotiation in between, has proved to be all too leisurely and fantastical.

Granted, the world and his dog knows that the Malian are in no fit state to fight a war in the north of the country. A military establishment that was riddled with corruption and incompetence even before the current crisis began has been bought to a state of catastrophic unreadiness by the army’s defeat at the hands of the MNLA and the Islamist coalition last April. It must also be remembered that the Malian army hasn’t won a military victory in the north without the use of Arab and Touareg militia since the early 1960s. The idea that the Salafist coalition currently ruling northern Mali was going to patiently wait around until next September whilst the Malian army was rebuilt with funding and expertise from the European Union was wishful thinking. The last few months have felt like a phoney war. There’s been nothing phoney about the fighting in the last few days.

Talking about the Fog of War in relation to northern Mali would be meteorologically unsound. Fog is almost unheard of in the Sahel. Better to call it the sandstorm of war, a haze that is more impenetrable and dangerous than fog. The vastly conflicting accounts of victories, defeats, advances, retreats, casualties and captives that have come spewing forth from the mouths of the spokespersons on either side of the conflict in recent days illustrate the dire opacity of this conflict and the near impossibility for a journalist to find the copper-bottomed truth about what is going on. A friend who works for Al Jazeera recently told me that in her honest opinion, the war in Northern Mali is the hardest conflict to understand in the world. Even obsessives like myself, who spend more time reading reports and analyses about the crisis or talking to people closely involved than is strictly healthy, have to admit that more often than not we are enveloped in a sandstorm of supposition and guess work.

Such is the case with the recent Islamist advance. I’ll give you my hunch, but it’s only a hunch. Short of trading my safe European home for a god-forsaken AQIM hostage camp in the Tegharghar mountains, I can’t do any better.  My guess is that the Iyad Ag Ghali, emir of the Touareg lead Islamist militia Ansar ud-Dine has become impatient with the Burkinabé sponsored mediation process between Mali and the two ‘Malian’ rebel factions, the nationalist MNLA and Ansar ud-Dine, which has been dragging on for a few months. The resumption of these talks that was due to take place on January 10th has now been pushed back to January 21st. Algeria has also re-entered the fray as a mediator, a role which it considered its own almost by divine right before it was taken off them by Burkina Faso at the beginning of the rebellion last February. This has no doubt taken the wind out of the Ougadougou talks and confused matters considerably. Both Ansar ud-Dine and MNLA signed an agreement to cease hostilities and pursue negotiation with Mali in Algiers on December 21st.  It’s this agreement which Ansar ud-Dine are now reneging upon.

The belligerent talk coming out of Bamako following the guarded approval given to a military intervention in the north by the UN in December undoubtedly angered Iyad Ag Ghali and his Touareg side-kicks.  You can feel this anger in the tone of the Political Platform which Ansar ud-Dine posted on their website on January 2nd.  What Iyad and his ghostwriter are saying, in grossly simplified terms is the following:  “I trusted you (Mali) at the end of the rebellion of the 1990s. You betrayed my trust by reneging on your promises and fomenting ethnic war in the north. This was gross ingratitude considering that it was ‘my’ rebellion that enabled you to overthrow your military dictatorship and bring back multi-party democracy in 1992. Now, once again, you’re double-crossing me. You persuaded us to agree to a cease-fire and to renouncing the armed struggle while you were busy importing tanks from Bulgaria and talking about war day in day out. Well if you want war, you can have it.” Iyad, a wily old jackal if ever there was, is no doubt gambling on the fact that the Malian army is too weak to offer any great resistance to his mujahedeen. He also knows that if he were to capture Mopti, the pressure this would then heap on the military junta and its political puppets in Bamako would be so immense that even if his Islamist army couldn’t hold such a large and hostile city for long, it might just afford him the time and strength to push through his demands for an autonomous Azawad modeled on the Autonomous Region of Kurdistan in northern Iraq. It’s a high stakes game but that’s nothing new. Ever since he launched the rebellion of 1990 with a handful of men and a few old Touareg swords, Iyad has proven himself to be a high-stakes player, at least in military terms.

The guessing game becomes even more enthralling when one tries to work out what’s happening within the Islamist coalition itself.  There have been significant changes in the last few months, but owing to the standstorm of war it’s been extremely hard to make any sense of them.  First the old desert fox, ‘Mr Marlboro’, Moktar Belmoktar was given his marching orders by the MUJAO command in Gao.  Was his old adversary Abou Zeid, head of AQIM in Timbuktu, just too sick and tired of him?  Was Belmocktar sick and tired of the more brutal and zany behaviour of the MUJAO chiefs in Gao?  Was he just piqued that the emirship of Al Qaida in the Sahara was handed over to Yahya Abou El Hamam rather than to him? Who knows.  After Belmoktar’s departure, there has been further splintering or atomizing of the Islamist movement, generally along ethnic lines.  A notorious drug don by the name of Sultan Ould Badi has formed a new militia called the Katiba Salah Eddine, after the famous scourge of Europe’s medieval Crusaders. Salah Eddine members are mostly Tilemsi Arabs from the villages north of Gao. Ould Badi was apparently none too pleased when the Mujahedeen Shura Council in Gao decided to go and ‘clean up’ In Khalil, a notorious border town north of Tessalit, the Sahara’s very own Ciudad Juarez, which is an entrepot for every kind of illegal merchandising making its way north or south, east or west through the desert. Ould Badi obviously balked at the idea that his carefully constructed smuggling networks might be dismantled or taken over.

Also in December, a certain Abdullah from Benin took control of yet another Islamist militia called the Katiba Ousmane Dan Fodio, named after a early nineteenth century Islamic preacher and jihadist who founded the Sokoto caliphate in what is now northern Nigeria. Abdullah came from the ranks of the Nigerian Islamist Boko Haram to take over the Ousmane Dan Fodio militia, which is said to comprise black Africans from Nigeria, Benin, Togo and Ivory Coast.  At around the same time MUJAO announced the creation of Ansar as-Sunna, a new katiba with four sub-brigades which, as stated earlier, is a vehicle for the scared and impoverished Songhoi and Fulani youth of Gao and its neighboring villages.  Finally, in the last few days, the redoubtable Omar ould Hamaha, aka Red Beard, has created his own katiba called Ansar Shari’a north of Timbuktu. This militia regroups the Berabiche Arabs of Timbuktu, Araouane and the neighbouring desert.

Are we seeing a planned and strategic reorganization of the Islamist coalition or a messy disintegration along ethnic lines that mirrors the fate of the Touareg rebel movement in the early 1990s? I suspect it is the latter. The desert has a tendency to work against unity and federation. Groups with from different ethnicities and with different interests manage to come together under a common banner for short periods of time, but then invariably revert to their natural state of independence and isolation. Any strong man with a little money and influence can set himself up as a new katiba and thus ensure his own and his family’s share of the spoils of both the war and the peace that must follow it. It’s also possible that the current atomization has to do with finance. Perhaps AQIM’s coffers are running a little bare due to lack of ransom income and reduced smuggling revenue. Without money, it would be hard for them to maintain a unified coalition in the north and persuade go-it-alone hotheads to stay together.

If we are seeing a disintegration of the movement, then this would add substance to the arguments of those who favor negotiation and a wait and see policy rather than swift military action. Perhaps there’s no need to defeat the Islamists militarily. Perhaps they’ll simply implode under the pressure of their own internal bickering. Perhaps this splintering is also the reason why Iyad has now decided to push south. No one knows the fractious tribal politics of the Sahara better than him and memories of the disintegration of the Touareg rebellion following the signing of the National Pact in 1992 no doubt still rankle deep within him. He knows that inaction leads to disintegration. If you want to unite your troops, go to war, or else provoke your enemy into attacking you. You can probably find that somewhere in the writings of von Clausewitz, the German philosopher of war to whom Iyad himself is apparently quite partial. If this is Iyad’s strategy, it’s showing early signs of success. His offensive has indeed lured French special ground forces and helicopters into the region, both of which will be deemed a heathen provocation by the Islamist constituency ofNorth and West Africa. The French presence will also no doubt boost recruitment to the Islamist cause.

However, the question of exactly how Iyad Ag Ghali has managed to bring together these disparate Islamist forces to attack Konna and push south still remains to be answered.  What deals have been done?  How does Iyad’s stated desire to see an autonomous Azawad sit with Ansar as-Sunna’s Songhoi footsoldiers desire to avoid a Touareg-dominated state in northern Mali at all costs. What’s in it for MUJAO?  They have never proclaimed the independence of Azawad, quite the opposite, and indeed only managed to rally the citizens of Gao to their side in their fight with the MNLA for the control of Gao back in June precisely because they claimed to defend the idea of a united of Mali.  And what of Algeria, Qatar or those Wahabi Saudi magnates with their petro-dollars and all the other shadowy forces who may or may not be playing a part in the current conflict. But that’s another sandstorm, even more impenetrable than the one that’s currently heading south towards Mopti.

Andy Morgan.  (c) 2013

Iyad Ag Ghali – Leader of Ansar ud-Dine

Even though it’s highly improbable that Iyad Ag Ghali wrote this tract, with its eloquent and flowing French, a language that Iyad is apparently not particularly enamoured with, I believe that it represents his political philosophy, his aims and objectives pretty accurately. I haven’t spoken to him to confirm this (who has?!!) but my hunch remains strong. Iyad sincerely believes that strict Salafist Islam is the ONLY way for his country and his people to return to strength, independence, justice and ultimately peace. And here, in this posting, his arguments are laid out plainly and coherently for everyone to read and react to. Now, you may disagree with him. Many in the international community…most…will disagree with him. But I believe that it’s no longer sufficient simply to claim that Iyad and Ansar Eddine are the pawns of Algeria or Qatar, or that their whole Salafi project is a smokescreen behind which the lucrative job of trading drugs, arms, people and cigarettes can continue (NB the final sentence of the platform vows pitiless justice and retribution on drug barons and major criminals). The basic message in the platform is that the post-colonial and democratic system in West Africa has failed the people miserably. Many ordinary citizens of Mali and its neighboring countries would agree with that assertion. The question is what is the alternative. Iyad believes that it is Islam. Many disagree with him. But many, more than we in the west find it comfortable to admit to, do in fact agree with him, partially if not entirely.

A couple of things strike me about Ansar Eddine’s platform. The first is that if you remove the religious references and Salafi rhetoric, the entire document could easily have been written by the MNLA propaganda machine. It’s Touareg nationalism pure and simple. This goes a long way to explain the occasional alliances between the MNLA and Ansar ud-Dine. At their core, their several projects are one and the same – a strong, independent, proud and free Azawad. It’s the Salafi and Shari’a aspect that divides them. In country less prone to settling its political problems with the Kalash, these positions might be represented by two legitimate political parties, one that favours a secular, liberal, democratic and pro-Western approach and another that favours an Islamist, Shari’a driven, anti-Western one. The situation in northern Mali is in fact analogous to that in Tunisia or Egypt. It’s only the stark peculiarity of the territory, with its vastness, its remoteness, its vacuum of governmental power, its lack of state security apparatus etc, that gives the political struggle in northern Mali its peculiarly violent, anarchic and dramatic character.

The black salafist flag that flutters in the hot desert breeze over Timbuktu symbolises the abject failure of western policy in the Sahel over the past decade or more. Many millions of dollars and euros that have been spent by the US, France and the EU to train the armies of Mali, Niger and Mauritania in counter-terrorism and to reinforce local judicial systems and police forces have, in effect, been frittered away.

The trust that western powers, especially the US and France, once placed in the toppled regime of the ex-Malian President, Amadou Toumani Touré, has been betrayed in spectacular fashion. They trusted him because they thought, or rather hoped in face of mounting evidence to the contrary, that he was a true democrat. In fact he was a really soldier at heart, a machiavellian manipulator of tribal politics and sponsor of self-serving networks of interest, corruption and even crime.

The US hoped that by training the Malian army to fight the mujahedeen of Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), who have been rampaging with near impunity in Mali’s northern deserts since 2008, they could empower a local solution to the problem of Islamic terrorism in the Sahel and avoid the pitfalls of doing the job themselves. Contrary to appearances, US global counter-terrorism policy has matured since the days when the Rumsfeld doctrine of direct military intervention was applied in Iraq. The Pentagon now knows that direct intervention is usually counter-productive, resurrecting as it does the red rag of American imperialism and driving hordes of young disaffected Arabs and Africans into the arms of Al Qaida and other terrorist groups.

It can be argued that indirect foreign military intervention has been partially successful in the case of Mauritania and Niger. Mauritania has been a willing participant in US counter-terrorism initiatives in the Sahel since 2002, including the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI) that was launched in 2005 with an annual budget of $100 million. It has also been a cornerstone of the US military’s annual Operation Flintlock exercises designed to increase local military and security capacity in West Africa. France has helped to fund and train the Mauritanian army’s rapid reaction units, and has played an increasing role in advising and strengthening the Mauritanian judiciary.

As a result, Mauritania has become the most ardent and effective opponent of AQIM in region, clinching several modest military victories against the terror group, most notably the joint Mali-Mauritanian attack on the cell of the redoubtable AQIM emir Abou Zeid in the Wagadou Forest of northern Mali in June 2011.

But Mauritania’s belligerence could still cost it dear. AQIM’s virulent hatred of Mauritanian President Mohammed Ould Abdel Aziz and his regime and the close links between local jihadists and the MUJAO, an AQIM spin off that now controls the strategically important city of Gao in eastern Mali, threaten to destabilise Mauritania. A massive car-bomb attempt on President Aziz’s life in February 2011 was foiled by the army but the President might not be so lucky next time. Furthermore, the Aziz regime has recently been mired in some weighty corruption scandals of its own, and there’s evidence that its popularity at home is on the slide. Mauritania’s close cooperation with the West could backfire if local disaffection translates into more willing jihadists on the ground.

President Mahamadou Issoufou of Niger has so far played a commendably level-headed and intelligent part in the crisis that has swamped the Sahel. The odds are against the world third poorest nation, beset as it is by the Libyan crisis to the north, the Malian civil war to the west and Boko Haram to the south, as well as catastrophic droughts, a massive refugee problem and the return of many thousands of migrant workers from Libya and other countries in the Maghreb.

Contrary to President Toure’s lax response in Mali, Issoufou was adamant about disarming Touareg fighters who flooded south into Ngier from the Libyan war last year. He has also made strenuous efforts to engage tribal chiefs and Touareg rebel leaders from Niger’s northern deserts in the country’s political institutions, promoting open government and freedom of expression in the process. His drive to achieve food self-sufficiency, a massively ambitious target that he’s busy promoting with the slogan Les Nigeriens Nourrissent Les Nigeriens – Nigeriens Feed Nigeriens – is both very necessary and popular at home. He has also been helped by the battle-fatigue caused by the bitter Touareg uprising of 2007-9.

Most importantly in regional terms, Issoufou is trying to turn the Malian crisis to his advantage by taking over from Mali as France’s most trusted and valued ally in the Sahel.  France needs Niger’s uranium, a fact that was strenuously underlined when President François Hollande met President Issoufou in Paris last June and urged him to make every effort to bring the massive new uranium mine at Imouraren in Niger on-stream as soon as possible. Niger and France have also been increasing their military cooperation and talking about a coordinated response to the terrorist threat.

Niger’s current state of grace is extremely fragile however. The problems of drought, refugees and returning migrants threaten to tip the country towards disaster at any moment. The Touareg in the north of the country could still make common cause with the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (NMLA), the Touareg rebel movement in northern Mali, presently licking its wounds after defeat at the hands of AQIM and its allies in Gao and Timbuktu, if their fortunes were ever to improve and the prospect of an independent Touareg-led Azawad became more likely.

In the case of Mali, however, the western policy of indirect intervention has been a disaster. The reasons for this are complex but boil down to the fact that, despite a few direct confrontations in 2010 and 2011 that cost the lives of a number of soldiers, Mali has never displayed the willingness or the military capacity needed to rid its country of the scourge of AQIM. Moreover, there is substantial evidence, including a direct admission made by the loyalist Touareg officer Colonel Alhadji Ag Gamou to the French newspaper Le Figaro in July this year, that Mali allowed AQIM to set up a safe-haven in the north east of the country, so long as it didn’t commit any acts of terrorism on Malian soil.

Why?  First, because Mali hoped that the presence of AQIM in the heart of Touareg rebel country would seriously damage and divide the Touareg secessionist cause.  In that regard, their hopes have been fully answered by recent events. Secondly, AQIM managed to  orge strong alliances with certain powerful figures from the Arab communities in northern Mali, some of whom were involved in drug and weapons trafficking. The government in Bamako had an interest in keeping these powerful northern figures on their side. And thirdly, the Malian army has always been incapable of securing military victory in the north, either against Touareg rebels or Islamic terrorists. Better to leave AQIM be than risk the lives of many more ordinary Malian soldiers. Despite this, the USA and France continued to pour millions into Mali’s military and security apparatus, money that all too often evaporated like a desert mirage as soon as it was spent. You need only read the cables sent by the US Embassy in Bamako and later exposed by Wikileaks to feel the extreme frustration that Mali’s lack of resolve in its fight against AQIM provoked in the diplomatic community in Bamako and elsewhere.

Thanks to bitter experience, the US now knows that you cannot use southern armies, who are used to combat in temperate sub-Saharan zones, to fight wars out in the open deserts of the Sahara. That’s why it has been reluctant to support a regional threat to launch an ECOWAS force of 3,000 troops against the various armed groups in the north of Mali, and has made sure that this reluctance has been echoed by the UN.

The only force capable of taking on and beating AQIM in northern Mali is the Algerian army. The armies of Morocco or Chad might also prove effective, but neither country has shown any willingness to become militarily involved so far, even if it were ever possible for them to do so, which is doubtful. The belief is growing that Algeria holds most of the keys to the problem. Nevertheless, it has always considered northern Mali to be its own backyard, and has put every possible effort into keeping it free of outside interference, whether from France, America, ECOWAS or anybody else. Moreover, so far at least, Algeria has kept its substantial military might well within its own borders.

Not that Algeria is unconcerned about the chaos in Mali. On the contrary, it views the idea of an independent Touareg state on its southern borders with extreme alarm. It has a substantial Touareg population of its own, who dominate its strategically important and mineral-rich southern deserts, and it fears that a Touareg victory in Mali could provoke those desert populations into copy-cat dissent. This fear also extends to the numerous other Berber populations in Algeria, especially the economically and politically powerful Kabyles. Algeria knows that any Touareg victory will be seen as a Berber victory at home, and the Berber cause for greater political and cultural rights has been a thorn in the foot of every Algerian government since independence.

The same is true in Libya, a country riven by racism and ethnic strife that has increased tenfold since the demise of Ghadafi. Recent anti-Touareg pogroms in the southern city of Ghadames and clashes between black-skinned Tubu and armed Arab militia in Sebha demonstrate the volatile relationship of Berber and African minorities with the Arab majority. Salafist elements in the new government see an AQIM hegemony over northern Mali as preferable to a Touareg state. Moreover, most of the weapons currently blighting the peace of northern Mali come from Libyan arsenals.

Rather than sending in the troops, Algeria has played an extremely subtle hand in the current conflict. Just before the outbreak of the Touareg rebellion in January, it sent a group of military personnel to the strategically important army base in the northern Malian town of Tessalit. As the NMLA wanted to avoid an open confrontation with Algeria at all costs, this move had the effect of delaying a Touareg victory by several months. Then, whether by shady design piloted by the Algeria secret services or merely by happenstance, AQIM and its allies managed to hi-jack the Touareg rebellion and kick the idea of an independent Azawad into the long grass. This outcome suited Algeria, despite the fact that the leaders of AQIM are ex-members of the GIA and GSPC, the terrorist groups responsible for the worst of the violence during Algeria’s dark decade of the 1990s. Better in Algeria’s mind for these home-grown jihadist to be causing havoc outside Algerian borders, than to let the existence of an independent Touareg state threaten Algeria’s territorial integrity.

Both France and the USA have never managed to have much leverage on Algerian foreign policy. The only real and immediate military solution to the chaos in northern Mali is therefore frustratingly beyond their grasp. The dominant super-powers will be forced to find other ways of containing the Islamist threat in the Sahel, a threat that could turn the entire region against them and spread into Europe and beyond.

Some fundamental questions will need to be asked. Can African governments be trusted to fight terror and crime, even if they are democratically elected?  What is more important, the integrity of African states or the fight against Islamic terrorism?  Is the nation-state even the best form of political organization in the Sahara?  Is it possible to win the war on terror with military might alone?  Finding answers to these questions is a challenge that becomes more and more pressing as the black flag continues to flutter over Timbuktu.

Andy Morgan.  (c) 2012

First published in BBC Focus On Africa Magazine – September 2012

These are serious accusations which bolster the long-standing theory that Algeria is using Islamist groups as proxies in Northern Mali to carry out its principle foreign policy aims in the region. These aims are, first and foremost, to prevent the creation of an independent state of Azawad by any means necessary.  Secondly, to make sure no foreign power, apart from itself of course, sends troops or humanitarian aid to northern Mali.  Thirdly, to ensure that Algeria remains the primary economic, diplomatic, political and developmental force in the region. And lastly, to make sure that Algeria eventually regains its historic role as power-broker and mediator par excellence in any conflict between Touareg separatists in the north east of Mali and the government in Bamako.  The job has temporarily been given to Burkina Faso, after the MNLA refused to allow Algeria to play their usual role back in February, stating that Algerian mediation had always ended proving disastrous for the Touareg cause. Algeria would like that role back.

Almost every leading politician or military leader of note with more than a passing interest in the situation in northern Mali has been beating a path to Algiers in recent weeks, from the newly appointed French foreign minister Laurent Fabius to the Malian Prime Minster Cheikh Modibo, as well as officers from the now as-good-as defunct Malian army.  For the moment, the Algerian government is listening and sitting pretty, refusing to take part in any military intervention in the north east whilst allowing the kudos and the solicitations to accrue.  The cynics and conspiracy-theorists would say that it doesn’t have to intervene militarily.  It has proxies like Iyad Ag Ghali and his Islamist Ansar ud-Dine militia or Al Qaida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in situ, on the ground, fulfilling its military objectives in a satisfactory way already.  But when the time is right, it will be ready and able move in the troops.

Whether or not the Algerian secret services, the DRS, are the puppeteers of the current chaos in northern Mali, Algeria’s policy in the region should become part of the curriculum taught to every student of African politics or international relations for years to come.  To put it simply, it has been masterful.  The prospect of an independent Azawad was no more welcome to Algeria at the start of the conflict than the prospect of an independent Kurdistan is to Turkey or Iran.  The Touareg of southern Algeria have never been as rebellious and belligerent as their cousins in northern Mali, but the government in Algiers knows full well that it wouldn’t take much to turn the simmering social tensions in its southern Saharan wilayas, or provinces, into a conflagration that it might find hard to control. The very idea of Touareg independence only needs success, or the perception of success, to gain considerable traction amongst the Touareg populations of other countries in the region, especially Algeria, Niger and Libya.  Furthermore, Touareg success is seen as Berber success, especially by Berber minorities in Algeria and Libya who have hungered for some kind of breakthrough in their fight for great political and cultural freedom for a long time.  The Berber struggle, particularly in the northern Algerian province of Kabylia, has been the main internal headache of Algerian governments since independence.  The last thing President Bouteflika needs right now in these fragile post-Arab ‘Spring’ times is for the numerous and restless Kabyle in his country, fired-up by the onward march of their Berber cousins in northern Mali, to launch a major uprising or secessionist attempt.

Moreover, Algeria takes a dim view of the prospect of Touareg separatists entering into any kind of cosy relationship with France and thereby letting the old colonial power regain a central role in the affairs of the Sahara, a role it has coveted ever since the late 1950s when it made an attempt to keep hold of the Sahara after independence.  France has always said that it’s number one priority is to put Mali back together again. But when will fighting Islamic terrorism override the priority of territorial integrity in the Sahel. And if it does, wouldn’t the MNLA, who are desperately putting themselves forward for the job, partner up well with France in the fight to rid northern Mali of rabid Islamist mujahedeen. The US, who, as the many Wikileaked Bamako embassy cables prove, have long had a surprisingly good grasp of the arcane politics of northern Mali, are no doubt asking themselves the same questions.  But, to put it crudely, Algeria’s general message to France, Europe and the US since the start of the uprising has been “Hands off!  The north of Mali has always been our backyard and we intend to keep it that way.”  Although the mineral and oil wealth that supposedly lies tantalizingly close under the sands of northern Mali has yet to be fully exploited, Algeria will aim to make sure that it has a major hand in its exploitation when the time comes.  It doesn’t want Australian, Canadian, French or Qatari companies sticking their mining noses in an area they feel is rightfully theirs.

When Khadafy fell last autumn, the prospects for Algerian foreign policy in northern Mali weren’t good. Contrary to popular belief, the wily Libyan dictator, who was as averse to the idea of an independent Touareg state in the Sahara as his counterparts in Algiers, had always been able to control, dampen and snuff out troublesome outbreaks of Touareg rebelliousness whilst simultaneously strutting around pretending to be a great friend of the Touareg and supporter of their cause.  With Khadafy’s useful blocking presence now swept away, and with truckloads of weapons pouring out of the arsenals of Libya, Algeria knew even before the outbreak of the rebellion on January 17th, that this time round, Touareg nationalism in northern Mali was going to become a major headache and foreign policy challenge. The MNLA’s rebuff of their early mediation proposal only enhanced that uneasy feeling.  But wisely, instead of carrying out a full frontal military intervention, they sat and waited, bolstering the military readiness of their army units stationed in Tamanrasset, and boosting their air-strike capacity.  They also sent a small contingent of army personnel to the key Malian military base of Amachache in Tessalit, a move which cleverly delayed the MNLA’s full frontal assault on the base by several weeks.  Meanwhile they refused to allow wounded MNLA soldiers into Algeria to get treatment, in contravention of the Geneva convention, and contained the many thousands of refugees who poured over their southern borders, fleeing the conflict.

In late March, when it looked like the Malian army was being routed by the MNLA and their Touareg Islamist allies in Ansar ud-Dine, and that total defeat was only days away, seven Algerian diplomats were kidnapped by the Islamist militia, the MUJAO, from the Algerian consulate in Gao.  Whether the dark hand of DRS manipulation played a part in this event or not, it allowed Algeria to present itself as a victim of the troubles, with a grievance that might legitimize its intervention, if necessary.  Then, after the MNLA prematurely declared the independence of Azawad on April 1st, matters began to go miraculously well for Algeria.  The boss of Ansar ud-Dine, Iyad Ag Ghali, a Touareg strong man who has been intimate with the Algerian military and security establishment since his days as leader of the nationalist MPLA in the early 1990s, basically hi-jacked the MNLA’s victory, replacing nationalism with Islamism and stating that his purpose was only Sharia law in the whole of Mali and not any kind of Touareg independence.  Suddenly, Ansar ud-Dine seemed to emerge as by far the strongest military group in the north, stuffed with well equipped, well paid and experienced fighters from the Ifoghas, the traditional ruling Touareg clan in the north east.  Where did Ag Ghaly find all the money to transform what had been a minor group comprising a few hundred men at the start of the uprising in January into the leading military power in the north.  Was it from his friends in Algeria?  Was it from super-wealthy contacts he made in Saudi Arabia back in 2007, when he was posted to the Malian consulate in Jeddah?  Was it from the Prince of Qatar, always happy to see the advancement of Salafist ideologies anywhere in the Muslim world?  Was it from rich local Arab drug barons?  Was it from the war chests of Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, bloated by the proceeds of their kidnapping exploits in recent years?  Was it from a combination, or even all, of these?

Soon after the MNLA’s indepdence declaration on April 1st, AQIM and MUJAO surged from nowhere and grabbed Timbuktu and Gao respectively, both using Ag Ghali and Ansar ud-Dine as a kind of front to appease local Touareg.  Both these terror organizations were in effect representing the interests of local Arab-speaking populations and especially those of powerful Berabiche Arab and Tilemsi Arab drug smuggling dons, who also reviled the prospect of a Touareg dominated independent Azawad. The aims of these powerful Arabs chimed perfectly with those of the Algerian government, and with what was left of the Malian government as well: we all must prevent an independent Azawad at all costs. No one can understand what’s happening in northern Mali without trying to get to grips with Arab vs Touareg tribalism, which is a tale of mind-befuddling complexity and longevity in itself.

Then, a few weeks ago, MUJAO, with the backing of the local Songhai population, who were also desperately keen for Gao and the north to remain part of Mali, managed to kick the MNLA out of the city.  This was a major defeat, and an acute embarrassment, as the MNLA had long declared that Gao would be the capital city of their independent state. The dispirited, penniless and ill-disciplined Touareg rebel force had been given its comeuppance.  For the moment, the dream of an independent Touareg state lies dead in the water.  Since their defeat in Gao, word has it that MNLA leaders have been contemplating abandoning their erstwhile uncompromising demand for total independence, and talking to representatives of the African Union, ECOWAS and yes, even Mali itself, about creating an autonomous Touareg-dominated homeland in the north east, modeled on the state of Quebec in Canada, which would enjoy considerably greater economic, political and cultural freedoms than ever before but would, crucially, remain a part of Mali.  The theory goes that the MNLA might be able to rescue the situation, and their dignity, if they ally themselves with the rump of the Malian army and take the fight to the Islamists.  That way, they’ll get the African Union, ECOWAS, France, the US firmly behind their cause, but the price they’ll have to pay is the abandonment of their long-cherished dream of an independent Azawad.  “The rout of the Touareg of the MNLA in Gao is a good thing,” an Algerian DRS agent recently told the French magazine, Jeune Afrique. “Now, the ex-rebels will turn to the Malian army.”   In other words, Azawad is dead. Algeria is happy. Mission accomplished.

So what about the big Algeria – Terrorist collusion theory?  Did Algeria plan the Islamist hi-jack of the Touareg cause?  Did it mastermind it?  Did it finance it?  Or did events just spin themselves out with glorious serendipity?  Anybody who knows the long dark history of Islamic insurgency in Algeria also knows that the Algerian government is no stranger to the manipulation of Islamist movements.  There are examples aplenty of government collusion with terrorists from the bloody civil war of the 1990s.  The man who created the GSPC, the fore-runner of AQIM, Hassan Hattab, was an ex-Paratrooper in the Algerian army.  Amari Saïfi, aka Abderrazak ‘El Para’, who carried out the kidnapping of 32 western tourists in southern Algeria in 2003, the event that launched the kidnapping game in the southern Sahara, was not only an ex-Paratrooper, but also a special forces operative, trained in the USA and Russia, who spent time as a bodyguard to General Khaled Nezzar, one of Algeria’s most powerful men.  Iyad Ag Ghali made excellent links with the Algerian army and the DRS in the 1990s, as leader of the Touareg rebellion and in the 2000s, as a hostage-negotiator of choice.  So there’s form to support the theory.  But, unfortunately, no really hard evidence.  Hard solid copper-bottomed evidence, that’s what we hacks in the media need.  I do wish that Toumast Press, rather than just reporting hearsay, would distribute a few discreet cameras with telephoto lenses to friendly, and courageous, operatives in Gao and Timbuktu, so that they can capture any collusion between Algeria and the Islamists on film and post it on You Tube for the world to see.  Easier said than done, I know.  But we need that evidence, guys, and we need it badly.

In the end, whether Algeria has been playing chief puppeteer in northern Mali or whether fate has simply smiled on its parade, the recent turn of events has delivered almost everything that Algeria could have wished for.  Somehow, and I admit I don’t exactly know how, they have played an absolutely masterful game.

Well, that unity has now completely broken down.  MUJAO is a strange beast.  It first appeared last November, when it claimed responsibility for kidnapping 3 European NGO workers in a Polisario run refugee camp near Tindouf in the far south west of Algeria.  Next, it blew up a police training academy in the southern Algerian city of Tamanrasset.  Then, in April, MUJAO kidnapped 7 Algerian diplomats from the Algerian consulate in Gao and is still holding them captive.  After the fall of Gao in early April, it quickly became apparent that MUJAO, which initially seemed to be a largely Mauritanian group lead by a Franco-Moroccan man, had formed an alliance with the Tilemsi Arabs of the Gao region, many of whom are lynchpins of the drugs trafficking game in the far east of Mali: men like Sherif Ould Tahar, Mohammed Rouggy and their father-in-law Mohammed Ould Mataly, all from the Bourem / Almoustrat area, where the biggest of the famous ‘Flight Cocaine’ jets landed and disgorged its immense cargo of drugs a few years ago.

All these men have had close links with AQIM in the past.  Maybe they struck a deal with MUJAO to defend Arab interests in the Gao region and to block NMLA and therefore Touareg power there.  I’ve also heard that most of the MUJAO fighters are black Africans, and that Boko Haram elements have also been involved in the fighting in Gao these past few days.  And since, unlike the NMLA, the avowed aim of the Islamists in this struggle has never been to divide Mali in two, but rather to impose Sharia law on the whole of Mali, perhaps MUJAO have become strange bedfellows with Ganda Koy and Ganda Izo, the two Songhoi militias who have long been fighting any attempt by Touareg further north to secede from Mali and create an independent state of Azawad.  The footage of black Songhoi residents of Gao taking to the streets and denouncing the NMLA while chanting the name of Ansar Eddine, could be the result. We have to allow however for the fact that the NMLA have been very lax in the past few months when it comes to maintaining law and order.  A few days ago, the NMLA leadership even met with the youth of Gao and reportedly apologised for these mistakes.

Whatever is behind this latest fighting, all pretence that the NMLA and Ansar Eddine / MUJAO / AQIM can live together and build the new Azawad together has gone.  And the lie that the Touareg  nationalist movement and the Islamic terrorists are in alliance with each other, which has been peddled by Mali for the past five years or more, has also bitten the dust.  The NMLA teamed up with Ansar Eddine when it was convenient to do so. Now, as expected, they’re at loggerheads. And the NMLA claim that it has 10,000 well armed soldiers who could easily take on the Islamists has also been proved false.  The Islamists are obviously better equipped and better trained than the NMLA, hence the victory of the MUJAO over the NMLA unit who were guarding the Governor’s residence in the centre of Gao.  But I would guess that the NMLA fighters have a clearer and better understanding of why they are fighting. They have retreated to the Firhoun base on the outskirts of Gao and are likely to attack again.  The outcome of this struggle still very uncertain.

And the death of One-eyed Jack, if it is true, is a victory not only for the NMLA but for all those who wish to see that unholy alliance of Al Qaida and drugs / weapons / people traffickers in the southern Sahara crushed and destroyed. Belmokhtar has been smuggling, kidnapping, killing in the southern Sahara since the early 1990s, when he was the GIA’s ‘man in the south’ and something of a Bin Laden, Scarlet Pimpernel and Al Capone, all rolled into one.  He was a desert boy, born and bred in Ghardaia, Algeria, who was “seduced”, in his own words, by jihad in his teenage years and travelled to Afghanistan to receive training in Al Qaida camps near the city of Jalalabad. It was in Afghanistan, so he claimed, that a piece of Russian shrapnel robbed him of an eye. Belmokhtar returned to Algeria in the early 1990s and became the don of the southern Saharan smuggling game, forging strong links with arms, drugs and people smugglers and befriending various Touareg and Berabiche tribal leaders in the process. He even married one, or possibly several Berabiche Arab girls from Timbuktu and once declared that he would like to ‘retire’ to northern Mali when his hustling days are over. He also joined the GIA in the early 1990s and then left with Hattab to become part of the GSPC.
By the turn of the millennium, Belmokhtar had risen up the ranks to become one of the GSPC’s leading emirs in the Sahara.  He collaborated with El Para on refocussing GSPC operations further south, but the pair soon fell out, jealous of each others’ power. Whereas El Para ventured into ill-advised waters by seeking to buy arms in Chad and eventually got himself caught and extradited back to Algeria, Belmokhtar, with unfailing shrewdness of judgement, evaded capture for more than two decades. The French security services called him l’inssaisisable, the ‘uncatchable’. Whilst Belmokhtar’s rival at the top of AQIM’s Saharan hierarchy, Abou Zeid, is reviled for his brute cruelty and appetite for chopping the heads off his kidnap victims, Sahara watchers often regarded the one-eyed Monsieur Marlboro with a grudging respect, recognising his relative restraint in the treatment of hostages. Many are also convinced he’s only in it for the money and always has been. “Belmokhtar will kidnap, rob or smuggle anything for anyone,” a silver-haired Saharanist once said to me, “so long as the price is right.”

Well, as they say, an eye for an eye makes the whole world blind.  Let’s hope Belmokhtar is no more!

Andy Morgan, 28th June 2012.

A few days ago, on Friday March 23rd, I managed to reach an MNLA fighter called Intarhia on his satellite phone.  When I called, he was in a 4×4 that was being driven across open desert, seemingly at top speed going by the incessant roar that formed a trying backdrop to our conversation.  This a transcript of our interview:

Andy:           How are things where you are right now?

Intarhia:         For us, things are going very well, hamdullilah.  We are to the north of Timbuktu.  A week ago we liberated certain zones in the region of Timbuktu, certain cercles [administrative regions] and towns.  Thirteen towns and villages in all.

A:         So not Timbuktu yet.  That must be the next stage mustn’t it?  The city itself?

I:         Yes, Timbuktu will probably be the next place.  In a few days, inshallah, all of Azawad will be free.

A:         Will it be a big challenge to Timbuktu for you and your men?

I:         Not, it’s not something big.  It’s a little thing.

A:         When you have liberated a village or a town, what’s your strategy?  Do you leave some men there to keep order?

I:         Yes indeed, that’s what we do.  We leave a certain number of men to ensure the security of the village and maintain order, and to help the population, raise the flag.  That’s it.

A:         And do you take care of humanitarian issues too?  If there are civilians in distress who don’t have enough to eat etc, do you help?

I:         Yes, indeed.  We help in any way we can.

A:         Will the events in Bamako in the last few days and the coup d’état, will they help or hinder your cause?

I:         The coup d’Etat…if they accept talks for independence, then there’s no problem.  But not if they act like the last President, like the old government.

A:         But would you prefer to have ATT or Capt. Sanogo in front you.  Who’s better, or is it all the same to you?

I:         They’re the same for us.

A:         So would you say that the morale among your fellow fighters is very good right now?

I:         Yes our fighters have good morale.  They also have the capacity.

A:         And how do find supplies, food and drink and all that.  Is it hard or can you organise that aspect easily?

I:         No, we organise that very easily.  Very easily.  Even before, back in history, we were able to organise our struggle, our combat, everything.

A:         So you find enough to eat whilst you’re on the road.  People give you stuff to eat.  Is that how it works?

I:         We have everything we need.  We have food, we have fuel, we have everything.  We need nothing, except Azawad today.  Liberation, that’s all we need!

A:         Yes, of course.  No, I just want to know where it comes from.  Is it sourced locally, or does it come from elsewhere?  From Algeria?

I:         It comes a bit from everywhere.  Even neighbouring countries know that we need help today, financial help and all that.  Even Mali is looking for help, so all the more reason for us, the army of Liberation, to do so.

A:         Are there Arab and Songhai fighters with you at the moment?

I:         Yes, all the ethnicities of the Azawad are with us.  Even the Peulh.

A:         So I just want to talk about certain accusations that have been leveled in the international press, to get your opinion on them.

I:         Yes?

A:         They say that you are mercenaries who have come back from Libya. What do you have to say to that?

I:         We aren’t mercenaries.  We’re here for the liberation of Azawad, which has been occupied for more than 52 years by the enemy.  We aren’t mercenaries.  He who thinks like that…it’s a lie.  France came here to our home, to take over these lands. Then she handed them over to Mali in the 1960s.  And until today, France hasn’t been able to come back and separate us again.

A:         And people also say that you’re in alliance with Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb.  What have you got to say about that?

I:         AQIM is a project that comes from our neighbouring countries.  It’s their project.  It’s their way of managing and controlling the situation here.  But they can’t do anything against us.  Yes.  They see an empty territory, like Azawad, and they want to insert their project into Azawad.  And Mali says nothing.  We’re here suffering in Azawad thanks to their project.  Yes.

A:         And so, after the liberation of the country, do you intend to also liberate the country from Al Qaida?  That’s to say to chase Al Qaida out from Azawad?

I:         Yes indeed. Yes, indeed.  When we liberate the country we will chase all our enemies from Azawad.  ALL our enemies!

A:         OK.  But there’s still the status of Iyad Ag Ghali, and his militia that is called Ansar Eddine.  It’s creating plenty of confusion here in the west.  Because people hear that Iyad wants to impose Sharia law in Azawad.  What do you think of all that?

I:         Iyad is an ally, an ally of the movement, that’s all. But if he does something like that he’ll be chased away.  We won’t even recognize him anymore.

A:         OK. So that’s to say that you’re together for the liberation, but you’re not together when it comes to imposing Sharia law and that kind of thing of afterwards.

I:         No. Everything decreed by the UN, the United Nations, and in accordance with all UN law, yes?

A:           Yes, but just to stay with Iyad…sorry to repeat the question.  So Iyad is an ally.  We can understand that.  But his project is rather Islamist and people in the west and international opinion, are very confused by that.  Because you say you’re not allied to Al Qaida but after all, Iyad is seeking a state governed by Sharia etc etc.  The effect of that situation outside the desert is a general confusion..

I:         Yes.  It’s the complicity of two countries, the complicity of various countries that has put Iyad in that situation and imposed him on our movement.  But we couldn’t care less.  If he carries on like that, we’ll just chase him out of the country.   He’s against everyone.  He’ll become like Mali, or Al Qaida or anyone else.  Azawad will be liberated from all those enemies.

A:         And what do you think about the situation with Colonel Alhaji Ag Gamou [Head of the Malian armed forces in the north east of the country - Ed].  Because after all he is a Tamashek like you and people who don’t know the culture very well think that it’s a contradiction for him to fight against his Tamashek brothers.

I:         Yes, indeed.  We know him. He’s a brother.  And what worries us a lot is that he is with the enemy and he’s shooting at us.  The law doesn’t allow him to do that.   He will be captured and he’ll be judged under the law.

A:         Can you say how many vehicles and men are with you at the moment in your unit?

I:         In our unit…we’re divided into bases.  In this base here there are 400 vehicles, in one single base.  In all we have ten bases.  400 multiplied by ten, makes 4,000 vehicles.  All-terrain vehicles.

A:         And that’s in the Timbuktu sector?

I:         Yes, that’s in the Timbuktu sector.

A:         And in that sector Mohammed Ag Najm is the commander right?

I:         Yes, indeed.

A:         And so I just wanted to ask if you wanted to say something that I can transmit to the public here in Europe.

I:         Only that we, the Azawadians, the Africans who live in Azawad, we need our liberty, that’s all.  Please convey that to the people of Europe.  We’ll never stop until we have our independence, even if we have to go to Bamako, or to Kayes.  We’ll penetrate that far, just to have our independence.  The world mustn’t think that there’s Al Qaeda here with us, and all that stuff.  We have absolutely no alliance with Al Qaida, or with any other rebel movement.  The only thing that’s important is the liberation of Azawad.

A:         OK, thanks.

Dear LRB,

This excellent essay is a very good example why good print journalism should, must, nay, will, I believe, survive.   The best way of understanding any hot and complex topic of the day, from an Arab revolution to a phone hacking scandal to the future of the print media, is by reading good journalism, either in print or online.  TV and Radio don’t even come close.  The Twittersphere, Facebook, 99% of blogs etc etc have many varied advantages and trump card qualities, but in depth analysis and good writing are rarely among them.

My interest in the essay is more than vague and passing.  I’m a journalist (music and culture primarily) who, like many other journalists, is wondering how my chosen profession is going to put enough food on my table in five years time, or maybe even less than that.   I cling to the idea that the need and demand for good in depth writing will never go away, and that someone, somewhere will find a way of both supplying that demand, mostly online probably, AND getting people to pay for it willingly, instinctively.

A tall order I agree.  But I believe that what is primarily at fault with current ham fisted attempts to find the right ‘monetizing’ model, including Murdoch’s ridiculous experiments with pay-walls, is technical and procedural in nature rather than philosophical and strategic.  In short, no solution will be forthcoming until the internet as a whole finds a safe, secure, universal and EASY way of dealing with micro-payments.   Buying a piece of journalism online has to be made as easy as walking into a newsagents and buying a newspaper.   At the moment, the online shopping experience is frankly absurd.   How would bricks and mortar retailers fare if the following scenario occurred every time you wanted to buy let’s say, a pint of milk and a paper?:

CUSTOMER:    Pint of milk please…oh, and a copy of The Guardian.

SHOPKEEPER:    Great.   Can you fill out this form first please.

CUSTOMER:    Form?  What form?

SHOPKEEPER:    Oh, it’s a registration form.  We need your name, address and a unique password, which you have to fill in twice.  Don’t worry about all the market research questions, you don’t really have to fill those in mate!

CUSTOMER:    But why do I have to do this.  I only want to spend £2.45.

SHOPKEEPER:    Oh, that’s because we need you details so that we can market our products to you.  And you’ll need your  password if you want to buy anything else from us.

CUSTOMER:    You what??!!   But I don’t want to be marketed to.  I only want a blessed pint of milk and a paper.   Oh well, ok…

[Customer fills out form in a fit of frustration and hands it to shopkeeper]

SHOPKEEPER:    Thank you very much.  Oh, oh dear.  I’m afraid your passwords don’t match.  Here’s a new form.  Could you fill it out again…

[Customer fills out form again, turning red with mounting rage...]

SHOPKEEPER:    Oh great.  It works now.  We’ll send a note to your address in the next few minutes, and then you can come back and pick up your pint and paper.

CUSTOMER:    But can’t I just walk away with them now.

SHOPKEEPER:    No, sorry sir, it’s security you know.  Can never be too careful…

[And so on until customer pulverises shopkeeper to a bloody pulp and gets life with no parole before 20 years etc etc.   A sad tale.]

Anyway, the point of this little vignette is to illustrate the absurd experience of shopping for inexpensive items online.   Newspapers, and most other online companies who have cheap (under £10) products to sell (newspapers, magazines, record labels etc etc) have made the huge mistake of sacrificing the ease and useability of the internet as a whole at the altar of binding customers to a shop / brand each time a purchase is made.  Murdoch et al also make the mistake of believing that online consumers of written journalism will be happy to ‘subscribe’ to one daily online newspaper, just as they used to do when they were subscribing to printed papers, and be satisfied with that single solitary online newspaper for all their news needs.   Er…sorry but it doesn’t work like that anymore Rupert.   With access to every newspaper in the world it’s now the online news consumer’s prerogative to look anywhere and everywhere for the writing and the coverage he or she desires.   Instead of paywalls and systems that attempt to shackle a customer to one online title via subscription, each article of any length and note (i.e long in depth features rather than small bitty news pieces) needs to be sold INDIVIDUALLY for a small amount, and the processing of that sale needs to be extremely easy, as easy as handing a few coins over a shop counter.

Let me explain how it could work.   Some company or organization, let’s say Pay Pal just for the sake of argument, develop an online ‘wallet’ for payments under £10.  You top it up with money when necessary, or it can be done automatically when the amount in it falls below a certain thresh hold.  You open your wallet at the beginning of an internet surfing session by logging into it, giving it your password etc etc.  Your wallet will then stay open for the duration of that session.  (For safety’s sake, it could close automatically if you don’t use it for a user defined period, let’s say 30 mins, or when a certain total spend has been reached, say £50).   And off you go.   An article in LRB catches your attention with a free-to-view 200 word extract.  You like what you read or you might be a fan of the writer.   Two clearly displayed buttons read “To read this article pay £0.15p.  To download it as PDF pay £0.50p”  You click on the fist option and the princely sum of 15p is taken electronically from your wallet and, by some complex circuitous route, ends up in LRB’s coffers.   The article ‘unlocks’ itself and you ready away happily.  Simple as that.  You carry on surfing, buying and reading articles in the same way from the New York Review of Books, The Guardian, The National in Abu Dhabi, the Sydney Morning Herald, Foreign Policy and Vanity Fair.   You so enjoy the Vanity Fair article that you opt to pay a little more, say £2.50, for the right to download a number of current articles, equivalent to what the old printed version of the magazine might contain.  You also buy two tracks from the website of Dog Hair Records out of Cleveland Ohio, a ringtone from Doo Wop Productions in Baton Rouge, Louisiana and a 52 minute documentary from the BBC.   Each of these items cost less than £10.  Anything over that requires you to go through the rigmarole of inputting name, password, credit card details.  And you put a limit on what can be spent in one session, thus avoiding any major fraudulent use of your wallet, by your teenage daughter or by a more sinister party.

OK, so none of the news organizations from whom you’ve bought content end up with your details, the all important e-mail, which to procure, so online marketing gurus say, is a holy and essential part of any online transaction.  But they’re wrong.  The internet needs to do away with that old hat idea and realise that until a consumer can breeze freely from site to site at his or her complete convenience, and buy small chunks of content easily and quickly, there will be no answer to that ‘monetizing’ grail.   Every system so far devised has gone against the spirits of infinite freedom and infinite choice that inhabit the very heart and soul of the internet, alongside the sadly entrenched spirit of getting something, everything, for nothing.  And those monetizing systems are more often than not badly devised, illogical, annoying and totally off-putting.  We’ve all sat in front of our screens fuming because we’ve forgotten a password that we entered into some site 8 months ago and as a consequence are being denied access to an article or product etc etc.  People may balk at signing off an online standing order to pay £8.97 a month for access to a single publication’s website.   But who’s going to balk at spending a measly few pence with one click  to read an intelligent, well written, in depth article about a topic they happen to be very keen on that day.  I wouldn’t.   In many ways, the fact that LRB graciously gave me John Lanchester’s essay to read for free is in itself absurd.  I’m afraid to say that I haven’t been tempted to subscribe.  I’ve just done what 99% of folks who’ve passed here before me have done.  I came, I read and I moved on to my next, free, online thrill.   You might say I’m my own worst enemy, and you’d probably be right.

Yours sincerely,

Andy Morgan.

Tap Taps are decorated with a baffling mix of dazzling colours, geometric shapes, floral motifs, religious slogans and pop idols.  Apparently there’s a workshop in downtown Port au Prince which is responsible for most of this bodywork.  On my recent trip to Haiti, I was advised against visiting the place by my hosts, the UN World Food Program, because it’s in a ‘red zone’, which denotes maximum risk and danger of kidnapping.  Our security advisor said that we’d need a military escort to go there.  I didn’t have enough time to put one together.  Next time I might just say ‘in God we trust!’.

Here are some Taps Taps I managed to snap during a half hour stop at a busy Port au Prince roundabout:

Ousmane from Tamikrest

I’ve been busy translating the lyrics for the forthcoming album by Tamikrest, the band from north eastern Mali lead by the talented Ousmane Ag Moussa. If you don’t know them already check out their existing album ‘Adagh’. One thing I always suspected but now know for sure is that Ousmane is a really excellent poet. As usual when I’m trying to get to grips with Tamashek poetry in translation, reading Ousmane’s lyrics in French gives me the feeling that I’m drinking a super fine whiskey that’s been watered down to a faint and washed out compromise, in comparison with the original. It reminds me of something that I learned quickly when I went to the Sahara and started working with Touareg musicians: their lyrics, or poems, are at least as important as their music, and probably a lot more so.

Some people complain about the repetitive nature of Touareg music: the drone, the simple call and response arrangements, the track-bound linear form of every song. It’s only a problem if you don’t understand the lyrics. I’m certain of that. And of course, apart from the very few non-Saharans who have learned how to speak Tamashek fluently, and there are some of those blessed people out there, most of us don’t understand the lyrics. Which is a crying shame. It’s left to record companies to squeeze a French translation out of the artist, and then someone like me, to turn that French into English. I’ve tried my best, and hopefully, the core meaning of each song will be very clear. But all those verbal subtleties, the puns, the nuances, the colour of and the depth of meaning of the original, will hover like an enticing aura around the words, unreachable to most of us. I’d love to do some more in depth translating work, like a real project, where the poet and the translators (English, French etc), sit down over days, weeks even, and discuss meaning and word play and all those issues. A Scottish poet called Don Paterson, who I really admire, recently published a book of poems by Rilke. His essay on the great German poet seemed to imply that trying to achieve literal translations of poetry is a useless exercise. You can only ‘version’ the original into something approximate in a new language, like a DJ doing a remix of a song, or a Jamaican dub master creating a version excursion. I like that idea. It injects real creativity into the job of translating.

Anyway, let’s hope the opportunity presents itself soon. In the meantime, look out for the Tamikrest album, which will be out sometime later in the year on Glitterhouse Records. And don’t blame me for the translations…I did my best, honest!

Andy Morgan (c) 2011