MUSIC

CULTURE

& CONFLICT

IN MALI

By Andy Morgan

AVAILABLE FROM:

FREEMUSE BOOKSTORE
iTUNES BOOKSTORE
AMAZON

“‘Andy takes you on a clear and considered journey through the complexities of modern Mali. A must read for all those interested in the culture of West Africa.” DAMON ALBARN.

“…one of the few positives to come out of the occupation of the northern two-thirds of Mali by armed jihadist groups in 2012 was the informed analysis of Andy Morgan. Now his writing on the crisis has grown into a book. His final chapter is required reading, a tour de force of both profound humanity and intellectual clarity.” NIGEL WILLIAMSON, Songlines. 5/5 Stars.

“Andy Morgan brings his skills as a journalist combined with deep insight gained as manager of Tinariwen to sieve through the shifting sands of Saharan culture in this fine book.”  IAN BIRRELL, Daily Mail & founder of Africa Express

“Does a wonderful job of not only detailing what happened during that awful period, but explaining why it did, and how it could easily happen again if things don’t change.” RICHARD MARCUS, Blogcritics.

“Essential reading for anyone who has been touched by Saharan music. It gives a clear and gripping picture of what it’s like to live through the chaos of a 21st century conflict…A really valuable piece of work.”  JUSTIN ADAMS, guitarist, UK

“Morgan’s book is an excellent examination of the contradictory forces in the “war on culture” currently led by Islamists in Mali. Music, Culture and Conflict in Mali represents an essential resource for anyone, scholar or layperson, seeking to grasp the Malian crisis, contemporary West African culture, and the impact of extremist movements on cultural production.”  ERIC J SCHMIDT, Ethnomusicology Review, USA.

“Andy Morgan has written a book about the Tuareg people that brings us up close with them in their moments of horror and disgust during the reign of the jihadists in northern Mali.” BARBARA WORLEY, Senior lecturer of Anthropology at University of Massachussetts, Boston, USA

“A wonderful, sad and powerful read! I’m emotionally spent! This goes far further than an examination of the effect on musical life in Mali. It reaches into all aspects of Malian life, history and future. Most powerful though are the personal stories. This is an important record.”  ANN MACKEIGAN, Executive Producer, CBC Music, Canada.

“The book is brilliant. Andy Morgan has solid experience, partly inside the music industry, not least as manager of Tinariwen. On top of that he’s a writer who knows his stuff backwards. It’s a treat to be introduced to the whole conflict in such a competent way and get first hand experience of what happens when the prophecy of The Doors is fulfilled.”  TORBEN HOLLEUFER, Gaffa magazine, Denmark.

“Many thanks for this magnificent work. Even though it’s in English, I’ve almost read it all, it’s so well written and accessible.”  OUSMANE DIARRA, author, Mali.

“An absolutely fantastic read and an invaluable primer on the volatile Malian situation of the last years. ” CHRIS ECKMAN, Musician and Producer (Dirt Music, Tamikrest), Slovenia.

READ THESE EXTRACTS:

“We don’t want Satan’s music!” – Scenes of musical life under Shari’a Law

Music in the red zone – The Festival in the Desert and the advance of Islamism in the north

“We have come here to teach you the true faith,” – Vandalism and destruction along the great fault line of the Sahel

Tisrawt – The epic tale of a theatre company from northern Mali

The post NEW BOOK – Music, Culture & Conflict in Mali appeared first on Andy Morgan Writes.

The trust that western powers, especially the US and France, once placed in the toppled regime of the ex-Malian President, Amadou Toumani Touré, has been betrayed in spectacular fashion. They trusted him because they thought, or rather hoped in face of mounting evidence to the contrary, that he was a true democrat. In fact he was a really soldier at heart, a machiavellian manipulator of tribal politics and sponsor of self-serving networks of interest, corruption and even crime.

The US hoped that by training the Malian army to fight the mujahedeen of Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), who have been rampaging with near impunity in Mali’s northern deserts since 2008, they could empower a local solution to the problem of Islamic terrorism in the Sahel and avoid the pitfalls of doing the job themselves. Contrary to appearances, US global counter-terrorism policy has matured since the days when the Rumsfeld doctrine of direct military intervention was applied in Iraq. The Pentagon now knows that direct intervention is usually counter-productive, resurrecting as it does the red rag of American imperialism and driving hordes of young disaffected Arabs and Africans into the arms of Al Qaida and other terrorist groups.

It can be argued that indirect foreign military intervention has been partially successful in the case of Mauritania and Niger. Mauritania has been a willing participant in US counter-terrorism initiatives in the Sahel since 2002, including the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI) that was launched in 2005 with an annual budget of $100 million. It has also been a cornerstone of the US military’s annual Operation Flintlock exercises designed to increase local military and security capacity in West Africa. France has helped to fund and train the Mauritanian army’s rapid reaction units, and has played an increasing role in advising and strengthening the Mauritanian judiciary.

As a result, Mauritania has become the most ardent and effective opponent of AQIM in region, clinching several modest military victories against the terror group, most notably the joint Mali-Mauritanian attack on the cell of the redoubtable AQIM emir Abou Zeid in the Wagadou Forest of northern Mali in June 2011.

But Mauritania’s belligerence could still cost it dear. AQIM’s virulent hatred of Mauritanian President Mohammed Ould Abdel Aziz and his regime and the close links between local jihadists and the MUJAO, an AQIM spin off that now controls the strategically important city of Gao in eastern Mali, threaten to destabilise Mauritania. A massive car-bomb attempt on President Aziz’s life in February 2011 was foiled by the army but the President might not be so lucky next time. Furthermore, the Aziz regime has recently been mired in some weighty corruption scandals of its own, and there’s evidence that its popularity at home is on the slide. Mauritania’s close cooperation with the West could backfire if local disaffection translates into more willing jihadists on the ground.

President Mahamadou Issoufou of Niger has so far played a commendably level-headed and intelligent part in the crisis that has swamped the Sahel. The odds are against the world third poorest nation, beset as it is by the Libyan crisis to the north, the Malian civil war to the west and Boko Haram to the south, as well as catastrophic droughts, a massive refugee problem and the return of many thousands of migrant workers from Libya and other countries in the Maghreb.

Contrary to President Toure’s lax response in Mali, Issoufou was adamant about disarming Touareg fighters who flooded south into Ngier from the Libyan war last year. He has also made strenuous efforts to engage tribal chiefs and Touareg rebel leaders from Niger’s northern deserts in the country’s political institutions, promoting open government and freedom of expression in the process. His drive to achieve food self-sufficiency, a massively ambitious target that he’s busy promoting with the slogan Les Nigeriens Nourrissent Les Nigeriens – Nigeriens Feed Nigeriens – is both very necessary and popular at home. He has also been helped by the battle-fatigue caused by the bitter Touareg uprising of 2007-9.

Most importantly in regional terms, Issoufou is trying to turn the Malian crisis to his advantage by taking over from Mali as France’s most trusted and valued ally in the Sahel.  France needs Niger’s uranium, a fact that was strenuously underlined when President François Hollande met President Issoufou in Paris last June and urged him to make every effort to bring the massive new uranium mine at Imouraren in Niger on-stream as soon as possible. Niger and France have also been increasing their military cooperation and talking about a coordinated response to the terrorist threat.

Niger’s current state of grace is extremely fragile however. The problems of drought, refugees and returning migrants threaten to tip the country towards disaster at any moment. The Touareg in the north of the country could still make common cause with the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (NMLA), the Touareg rebel movement in northern Mali, presently licking its wounds after defeat at the hands of AQIM and its allies in Gao and Timbuktu, if their fortunes were ever to improve and the prospect of an independent Touareg-led Azawad became more likely.

In the case of Mali, however, the western policy of indirect intervention has been a disaster. The reasons for this are complex but boil down to the fact that, despite a few direct confrontations in 2010 and 2011 that cost the lives of a number of soldiers, Mali has never displayed the willingness or the military capacity needed to rid its country of the scourge of AQIM. Moreover, there is substantial evidence, including a direct admission made by the loyalist Touareg officer Colonel Alhadji Ag Gamou to the French newspaper Le Figaro in July this year, that Mali allowed AQIM to set up a safe-haven in the north east of the country, so long as it didn’t commit any acts of terrorism on Malian soil.

Why?  First, because Mali hoped that the presence of AQIM in the heart of Touareg rebel country would seriously damage and divide the Touareg secessionist cause.  In that regard, their hopes have been fully answered by recent events. Secondly, AQIM managed to  orge strong alliances with certain powerful figures from the Arab communities in northern Mali, some of whom were involved in drug and weapons trafficking. The government in Bamako had an interest in keeping these powerful northern figures on their side. And thirdly, the Malian army has always been incapable of securing military victory in the north, either against Touareg rebels or Islamic terrorists. Better to leave AQIM be than risk the lives of many more ordinary Malian soldiers. Despite this, the USA and France continued to pour millions into Mali’s military and security apparatus, money that all too often evaporated like a desert mirage as soon as it was spent. You need only read the cables sent by the US Embassy in Bamako and later exposed by Wikileaks to feel the extreme frustration that Mali’s lack of resolve in its fight against AQIM provoked in the diplomatic community in Bamako and elsewhere.

Thanks to bitter experience, the US now knows that you cannot use southern armies, who are used to combat in temperate sub-Saharan zones, to fight wars out in the open deserts of the Sahara. That’s why it has been reluctant to support a regional threat to launch an ECOWAS force of 3,000 troops against the various armed groups in the north of Mali, and has made sure that this reluctance has been echoed by the UN.

The only force capable of taking on and beating AQIM in northern Mali is the Algerian army. The armies of Morocco or Chad might also prove effective, but neither country has shown any willingness to become militarily involved so far, even if it were ever possible for them to do so, which is doubtful. The belief is growing that Algeria holds most of the keys to the problem. Nevertheless, it has always considered northern Mali to be its own backyard, and has put every possible effort into keeping it free of outside interference, whether from France, America, ECOWAS or anybody else. Moreover, so far at least, Algeria has kept its substantial military might well within its own borders.

Not that Algeria is unconcerned about the chaos in Mali. On the contrary, it views the idea of an independent Touareg state on its southern borders with extreme alarm. It has a substantial Touareg population of its own, who dominate its strategically important and mineral-rich southern deserts, and it fears that a Touareg victory in Mali could provoke those desert populations into copy-cat dissent. This fear also extends to the numerous other Berber populations in Algeria, especially the economically and politically powerful Kabyles. Algeria knows that any Touareg victory will be seen as a Berber victory at home, and the Berber cause for greater political and cultural rights has been a thorn in the foot of every Algerian government since independence.

The same is true in Libya, a country riven by racism and ethnic strife that has increased tenfold since the demise of Ghadafi. Recent anti-Touareg pogroms in the southern city of Ghadames and clashes between black-skinned Tubu and armed Arab militia in Sebha demonstrate the volatile relationship of Berber and African minorities with the Arab majority. Salafist elements in the new government see an AQIM hegemony over northern Mali as preferable to a Touareg state. Moreover, most of the weapons currently blighting the peace of northern Mali come from Libyan arsenals.

Rather than sending in the troops, Algeria has played an extremely subtle hand in the current conflict. Just before the outbreak of the Touareg rebellion in January, it sent a group of military personnel to the strategically important army base in the northern Malian town of Tessalit. As the NMLA wanted to avoid an open confrontation with Algeria at all costs, this move had the effect of delaying a Touareg victory by several months. Then, whether by shady design piloted by the Algeria secret services or merely by happenstance, AQIM and its allies managed to hi-jack the Touareg rebellion and kick the idea of an independent Azawad into the long grass. This outcome suited Algeria, despite the fact that the leaders of AQIM are ex-members of the GIA and GSPC, the terrorist groups responsible for the worst of the violence during Algeria’s dark decade of the 1990s. Better in Algeria’s mind for these home-grown jihadist to be causing havoc outside Algerian borders, than to let the existence of an independent Touareg state threaten Algeria’s territorial integrity.

Both France and the USA have never managed to have much leverage on Algerian foreign policy. The only real and immediate military solution to the chaos in northern Mali is therefore frustratingly beyond their grasp. The dominant super-powers will be forced to find other ways of containing the Islamist threat in the Sahel, a threat that could turn the entire region against them and spread into Europe and beyond.

Some fundamental questions will need to be asked. Can African governments be trusted to fight terror and crime, even if they are democratically elected?  What is more important, the integrity of African states or the fight against Islamic terrorism?  Is the nation-state even the best form of political organization in the Sahara?  Is it possible to win the war on terror with military might alone?  Finding answers to these questions is a challenge that becomes more and more pressing as the black flag continues to flutter over Timbuktu.

Andy Morgan.  (c) 2012

First published in BBC Focus On Africa Magazine – September 2012

The post Northern Mali – A failure of Western policy in the Sahel appeared first on Andy Morgan Writes.

These are serious accusations which bolster the long-standing theory that Algeria is using Islamist groups as proxies in Northern Mali to carry out its principle foreign policy aims in the region. These aims are, first and foremost, to prevent the creation of an independent state of Azawad by any means necessary.  Secondly, to make sure no foreign power, apart from itself of course, sends troops or humanitarian aid to northern Mali.  Thirdly, to ensure that Algeria remains the primary economic, diplomatic, political and developmental force in the region. And lastly, to make sure that Algeria eventually regains its historic role as power-broker and mediator par excellence in any conflict between Touareg separatists in the north east of Mali and the government in Bamako.  The job has temporarily been given to Burkina Faso, after the MNLA refused to allow Algeria to play their usual role back in February, stating that Algerian mediation had always ended proving disastrous for the Touareg cause. Algeria would like that role back.

Almost every leading politician or military leader of note with more than a passing interest in the situation in northern Mali has been beating a path to Algiers in recent weeks, from the newly appointed French foreign minister Laurent Fabius to the Malian Prime Minster Cheikh Modibo, as well as officers from the now as-good-as defunct Malian army.  For the moment, the Algerian government is listening and sitting pretty, refusing to take part in any military intervention in the north east whilst allowing the kudos and the solicitations to accrue.  The cynics and conspiracy-theorists would say that it doesn’t have to intervene militarily.  It has proxies like Iyad Ag Ghali and his Islamist Ansar ud-Dine militia or Al Qaida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in situ, on the ground, fulfilling its military objectives in a satisfactory way already.  But when the time is right, it will be ready and able move in the troops.

Whether or not the Algerian secret services, the DRS, are the puppeteers of the current chaos in northern Mali, Algeria’s policy in the region should become part of the curriculum taught to every student of African politics or international relations for years to come.  To put it simply, it has been masterful.  The prospect of an independent Azawad was no more welcome to Algeria at the start of the conflict than the prospect of an independent Kurdistan is to Turkey or Iran.  The Touareg of southern Algeria have never been as rebellious and belligerent as their cousins in northern Mali, but the government in Algiers knows full well that it wouldn’t take much to turn the simmering social tensions in its southern Saharan wilayas, or provinces, into a conflagration that it might find hard to control. The very idea of Touareg independence only needs success, or the perception of success, to gain considerable traction amongst the Touareg populations of other countries in the region, especially Algeria, Niger and Libya.  Furthermore, Touareg success is seen as Berber success, especially by Berber minorities in Algeria and Libya who have hungered for some kind of breakthrough in their fight for great political and cultural freedom for a long time.  The Berber struggle, particularly in the northern Algerian province of Kabylia, has been the main internal headache of Algerian governments since independence.  The last thing President Bouteflika needs right now in these fragile post-Arab ‘Spring’ times is for the numerous and restless Kabyle in his country, fired-up by the onward march of their Berber cousins in northern Mali, to launch a major uprising or secessionist attempt.

Moreover, Algeria takes a dim view of the prospect of Touareg separatists entering into any kind of cosy relationship with France and thereby letting the old colonial power regain a central role in the affairs of the Sahara, a role it has coveted ever since the late 1950s when it made an attempt to keep hold of the Sahara after independence.  France has always said that it’s number one priority is to put Mali back together again. But when will fighting Islamic terrorism override the priority of territorial integrity in the Sahel. And if it does, wouldn’t the MNLA, who are desperately putting themselves forward for the job, partner up well with France in the fight to rid northern Mali of rabid Islamist mujahedeen. The US, who, as the many Wikileaked Bamako embassy cables prove, have long had a surprisingly good grasp of the arcane politics of northern Mali, are no doubt asking themselves the same questions.  But, to put it crudely, Algeria’s general message to France, Europe and the US since the start of the uprising has been “Hands off!  The north of Mali has always been our backyard and we intend to keep it that way.”  Although the mineral and oil wealth that supposedly lies tantalizingly close under the sands of northern Mali has yet to be fully exploited, Algeria will aim to make sure that it has a major hand in its exploitation when the time comes.  It doesn’t want Australian, Canadian, French or Qatari companies sticking their mining noses in an area they feel is rightfully theirs.

When Khadafy fell last autumn, the prospects for Algerian foreign policy in northern Mali weren’t good. Contrary to popular belief, the wily Libyan dictator, who was as averse to the idea of an independent Touareg state in the Sahara as his counterparts in Algiers, had always been able to control, dampen and snuff out troublesome outbreaks of Touareg rebelliousness whilst simultaneously strutting around pretending to be a great friend of the Touareg and supporter of their cause.  With Khadafy’s useful blocking presence now swept away, and with truckloads of weapons pouring out of the arsenals of Libya, Algeria knew even before the outbreak of the rebellion on January 17th, that this time round, Touareg nationalism in northern Mali was going to become a major headache and foreign policy challenge. The MNLA’s rebuff of their early mediation proposal only enhanced that uneasy feeling.  But wisely, instead of carrying out a full frontal military intervention, they sat and waited, bolstering the military readiness of their army units stationed in Tamanrasset, and boosting their air-strike capacity.  They also sent a small contingent of army personnel to the key Malian military base of Amachache in Tessalit, a move which cleverly delayed the MNLA’s full frontal assault on the base by several weeks.  Meanwhile they refused to allow wounded MNLA soldiers into Algeria to get treatment, in contravention of the Geneva convention, and contained the many thousands of refugees who poured over their southern borders, fleeing the conflict.

In late March, when it looked like the Malian army was being routed by the MNLA and their Touareg Islamist allies in Ansar ud-Dine, and that total defeat was only days away, seven Algerian diplomats were kidnapped by the Islamist militia, the MUJAO, from the Algerian consulate in Gao.  Whether the dark hand of DRS manipulation played a part in this event or not, it allowed Algeria to present itself as a victim of the troubles, with a grievance that might legitimize its intervention, if necessary.  Then, after the MNLA prematurely declared the independence of Azawad on April 1st, matters began to go miraculously well for Algeria.  The boss of Ansar ud-Dine, Iyad Ag Ghali, a Touareg strong man who has been intimate with the Algerian military and security establishment since his days as leader of the nationalist MPLA in the early 1990s, basically hi-jacked the MNLA’s victory, replacing nationalism with Islamism and stating that his purpose was only Sharia law in the whole of Mali and not any kind of Touareg independence.  Suddenly, Ansar ud-Dine seemed to emerge as by far the strongest military group in the north, stuffed with well equipped, well paid and experienced fighters from the Ifoghas, the traditional ruling Touareg clan in the north east.  Where did Ag Ghaly find all the money to transform what had been a minor group comprising a few hundred men at the start of the uprising in January into the leading military power in the north.  Was it from his friends in Algeria?  Was it from super-wealthy contacts he made in Saudi Arabia back in 2007, when he was posted to the Malian consulate in Jeddah?  Was it from the Prince of Qatar, always happy to see the advancement of Salafist ideologies anywhere in the Muslim world?  Was it from rich local Arab drug barons?  Was it from the war chests of Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, bloated by the proceeds of their kidnapping exploits in recent years?  Was it from a combination, or even all, of these?

Soon after the MNLA’s indepdence declaration on April 1st, AQIM and MUJAO surged from nowhere and grabbed Timbuktu and Gao respectively, both using Ag Ghali and Ansar ud-Dine as a kind of front to appease local Touareg.  Both these terror organizations were in effect representing the interests of local Arab-speaking populations and especially those of powerful Berabiche Arab and Tilemsi Arab drug smuggling dons, who also reviled the prospect of a Touareg dominated independent Azawad. The aims of these powerful Arabs chimed perfectly with those of the Algerian government, and with what was left of the Malian government as well: we all must prevent an independent Azawad at all costs. No one can understand what’s happening in northern Mali without trying to get to grips with Arab vs Touareg tribalism, which is a tale of mind-befuddling complexity and longevity in itself.

Then, a few weeks ago, MUJAO, with the backing of the local Songhai population, who were also desperately keen for Gao and the north to remain part of Mali, managed to kick the MNLA out of the city.  This was a major defeat, and an acute embarrassment, as the MNLA had long declared that Gao would be the capital city of their independent state. The dispirited, penniless and ill-disciplined Touareg rebel force had been given its comeuppance.  For the moment, the dream of an independent Touareg state lies dead in the water.  Since their defeat in Gao, word has it that MNLA leaders have been contemplating abandoning their erstwhile uncompromising demand for total independence, and talking to representatives of the African Union, ECOWAS and yes, even Mali itself, about creating an autonomous Touareg-dominated homeland in the north east, modeled on the state of Quebec in Canada, which would enjoy considerably greater economic, political and cultural freedoms than ever before but would, crucially, remain a part of Mali.  The theory goes that the MNLA might be able to rescue the situation, and their dignity, if they ally themselves with the rump of the Malian army and take the fight to the Islamists.  That way, they’ll get the African Union, ECOWAS, France, the US firmly behind their cause, but the price they’ll have to pay is the abandonment of their long-cherished dream of an independent Azawad.  “The rout of the Touareg of the MNLA in Gao is a good thing,” an Algerian DRS agent recently told the French magazine, Jeune Afrique. “Now, the ex-rebels will turn to the Malian army.”   In other words, Azawad is dead. Algeria is happy. Mission accomplished.

So what about the big Algeria – Terrorist collusion theory?  Did Algeria plan the Islamist hi-jack of the Touareg cause?  Did it mastermind it?  Did it finance it?  Or did events just spin themselves out with glorious serendipity?  Anybody who knows the long dark history of Islamic insurgency in Algeria also knows that the Algerian government is no stranger to the manipulation of Islamist movements.  There are examples aplenty of government collusion with terrorists from the bloody civil war of the 1990s.  The man who created the GSPC, the fore-runner of AQIM, Hassan Hattab, was an ex-Paratrooper in the Algerian army.  Amari Saïfi, aka Abderrazak ‘El Para’, who carried out the kidnapping of 32 western tourists in southern Algeria in 2003, the event that launched the kidnapping game in the southern Sahara, was not only an ex-Paratrooper, but also a special forces operative, trained in the USA and Russia, who spent time as a bodyguard to General Khaled Nezzar, one of Algeria’s most powerful men.  Iyad Ag Ghali made excellent links with the Algerian army and the DRS in the 1990s, as leader of the Touareg rebellion and in the 2000s, as a hostage-negotiator of choice.  So there’s form to support the theory.  But, unfortunately, no really hard evidence.  Hard solid copper-bottomed evidence, that’s what we hacks in the media need.  I do wish that Toumast Press, rather than just reporting hearsay, would distribute a few discreet cameras with telephoto lenses to friendly, and courageous, operatives in Gao and Timbuktu, so that they can capture any collusion between Algeria and the Islamists on film and post it on You Tube for the world to see.  Easier said than done, I know.  But we need that evidence, guys, and we need it badly.

In the end, whether Algeria has been playing chief puppeteer in northern Mali or whether fate has simply smiled on its parade, the recent turn of events has delivered almost everything that Algeria could have wished for.  Somehow, and I admit I don’t exactly know how, they have played an absolutely masterful game.

The post Algeria plays a master’s game in northern Mali appeared first on Andy Morgan Writes.

Despite Ahmed’s claims, it now seems certain that up to 800 young Touareg have been lured north from Mali and Niger to go and fight as mercenaries for Gaddafi since the start of the Libyan uprising. This is unsurprising perhaps if you consider the dire state of poverty and joblessness in the southern Sahara. Decades of drought, under-development and ethnic conflict have recently been exacerbated by the presence of Al-Qaeda In the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) whose kidnappings have put an end to tourism and foreign investment in the region. Gaddafi’s promise of arms and petrodollars represent a pill of hope, albeit a bitter tasting one. Some Touareg youth feel they have no option but to swallow it.

Gaddafi has been buying the affections and fighting skills of the nomadic tribes of the Sahara for a long time. His vision of a borderless desert, an Islamic republic of the Sahara, has often found favour with the Touareg, who have been fighting their own struggle for political self-determination and cultural recognition against the governments of Mali and Niger since independence back in 1960. Gaddafi invited young Touareg immigrants in Libya to join his Islamic Legion in the early 1980s before sending them off to fight wars in Chad, the Sudan and the Lebanon. The same Touareg soldiers then unleashed their own rebellions against Mali and Niger in the 1990s. Despite widespread suspicion that Gaddafi only ever helped the Touareg to further his own territorial schemes, many Touareg fear the consequences of his fall from power. After all, for the past half century, he is the only head of state in the world who has ever supported their cause with arms and cash.

“The Touareg who are fighting in Libya are the ones who live there anyway,” says Nina Walet Intallou, elected member for the Kidal region in Mali’s national advisory council and representative of the Touareg rebel movement. “The south of Libya is Touareg territory. They’re obliged to hold on to what is theirs because if Gaddafi goes, they fear what will happen to them. There’s a risk of total destabilisation in the region. Many people in Libya detest the Touareg. Before Gaddafi came to power they weren’t allowed to go to Benghazi, for example, without a special pass.  So if Gaddafi’s enemies are given power, we’re really asking what will become of us.  We may even face the complete disappearance of the Touareg as a people.”

Other Touareg leaders cite the severe political and social strain that could result from the fall of the Gaddafi regime and the consequent return of thousands of exiled Touareg from Libya to their homelands in Mali and Niger. Many of these returnees will probably be impoverished, disaffected and, what’s worse, heavily armed.  Such an influx would pose a severe challenge to the already tenuous peace that exists between the Touareg and the central government of Mali in Bamako. Ironically, Gaddafi has also been investing heavily in agriculture, water infrastructure, hotels and other sectors in southern Mali, where the Touareg are seen as the enemy. Amadou Toumani Touré, the current President of Mali, was the first of many African leaders to call Gaddafi and express his support after the rebellion broke out in Libya. 

Hama Ag Sid Ahmed, spokesperson for the Democratic Alliance for Change (ADC), the Touareg rebel movement set up in the wake of an uprising in Kidal in 2006, is well aware of the ambiguous attitudes to Gaddafi among the Touareg. The Libyan leader has often given financial support to Ag Sid Ahmed’s boss, Ibrahim Ag Bahanga, the hard line Touareg rebel leader who has refused to make peace with the Malian government, blaming Mali’s intransigence and broken promises for his uncompromising stance.

“The Touareg are divided on the Libyan question,” says Sid Ag Ahmed. “Some say that Libya has sided with the Touareg during difficult moments in our history, and that Libya has been an invaluable rear base during the Touareg uprisings.  Others say that Libya has never brought us any concrete help or political progress.  And yet others say that Libya has actually prevented things evolving normally in the region.”

Gaddafi and his son Seif al-Islam Gaddafi have both played an active part in the endless peace negotiations between Touareg rebels and the governments of Mali and Niger.  In the case of Mali however, Libyan intervention has often lead to conflict with Algeria, who see the deserts just over their border with Mali as their own natural sphere of influence and resent Gaddafi’s meddling in the area.

On the international stage, Gaddafi has often proclaimed his great affinity to the Touareg as a people. He is said to have inherited some Touareg blood from his mother, and he sees the Touareg as natural allies in his overriding ambition to create a Sahara without borders, unified by Arab culture and Islam. However, Gaddafi’s international pronouncements are in stark contrast with the way in which he has treated the Touareg and their culture in his own country.  In a speech he gave in 1985, he famously claimed that mothers who taught their children Tamazight, the language of the Touareg, were injecting them with poison.

Akli Sheika, a Libyan Touareg living in exile in Britain, was imprisoned for teaching Tifinarh, the ancient Touareg alphabet, in Libyan schools.  “I consider Gaddafi to be the enemy number one of the Touareg people,” he told me. “Most of the Touareg in Libya want Gaddafi to leave. Gaddafi is recruiting the Touareg by force and threatening them with violence if they don’t fight with the protestors.  Many Touareg from Ghat and Ubari in the south have actually fled to Djanet in Algeria.”

When I speak to Abdallah, a Libyan Touareg who is virtually imprisoned in his family home in Tripoli by all the violence going on in the streets outside, his views are unequivocal.  “Countries like Mali and Niger who have been killing the Touareg for over forty years, now want to exploit the situation by saying that the Touareg are supporting the regime here,” he says in an anxious voice.  “But this is false. About 200 Touareg have been killed here because they refused to obey orders to shoot innocent protestors. And now the Touareg youth have joined the revolution against the regime…” Abdallah was only able to speak for a few more minutes before insisting he had to hang up because his mobile phone was being tapped.

The fall of Gaddafi is sure to bring fundamental changes to the political situation in the southern Sahara.  Whether, as many Touareg in Mali and Niger think, Gaddafi’s demise will spell disaster for the Touareg people, or, as many Libyan Touareg claim, it will spell freedom after four decades of oppression, remains to be seen.

(The names of some of the persons in this report have been changed to protect their identities).

Andy Morgan. (c) 2011

An edited version of this article was first published as a ‘Monocolumn’ by Monocle Magazine (online edition only) – March 2011

The post GADDAFI AND THE TOUAREG – Love, hate and petro-dollars appeared first on Andy Morgan Writes.

Some of the clichés of the European imagination can stand up to scrutiny. The Sahara is definitely hot, with a mean annual temperature of over 30°C. In the hottest months of April and May, just before the rainy season arrives, temperatures can leave the 50°C mark way behind. But the Sahara can also be cold, viciously cold. Hapless night travellers sometimes die of cold in the desert. The Sahara is certainly arid, with annual rainfall rarely more than 25mm and often less than 5mm in certain parts. An area like the Tanezrouft, the featureless plain that surrounds the ancient salt mines of Terhazza and Taodenni, is so dry that it is known as the ‘land of thirst’ or the ‘desert of the deserts’. In 1809 the bodies of 2000 caravaniers and their camels were found by chance in the Tanezrouft. Loosing your way and loosing your life can be fearfully synonymous in certain parts of the Sahara. But elsewhere, in the ‘wet’ months of July and August, floods occur, dry sandy beds become torrential rivers, lakes and ponds fill up, vistas become surprisingly green and wells overflow with water. At that time, local nomads feel a deep sense of relief and happiness as life is guaranteed for another year, and the impulse to celebrate and make music becomes especially potent.

The Sahara is vast. It spans the African continent from the Atlantic to the Red Sea, and from the Atlas ranges and the Mediterranean in the north to the Sahel in the south. The whole continent of Europe would fit into it easily, with plenty of space to spare. But in this huge expanse there is also a great variety of landscapes; seas of sand-dunes or ergs like The Grand Erg Occidental that faithfully provide a palpable answer to every child’s ultimate desert fantasy; billiard table-flat plains of gravel or regs that stretch for hundreds of miles like the Tanezrouft and Tamesna, so feared by generations of travellers; mountains ranges like the Hoggar, the Tibetsi, and the Aïr, with their mesas and lunar contours; desiccated scrublands in the Sahelian ‘coast’ of the southern desert; vast oases in the shadows of the Atlas ranges in the north. Each of these landscapes are capable of both extremely fierce, and extremely tender expressions, depending on the light, the heat and the time of day.

Although the Sahara is sparsely inhabited, with a population roughly one third that of greater London living in a territory far larger than Europe, it is by no means empty. The pre-historic stone carvings and paintings that literally litter some parts of the desert bear silent witness to a time when the Sahara was much wetter than it is today, carpeted by tall Savannah grasses and populated by rhinos, elephants, hippos, giraffes and chariot-riding humans. Since the land dried up, around 3000 BC, the Sahara has become a bolthole for peoples and tribes escaping invasion, war and oppression in North Africa, Egypt, The Middle East and black Africa. All the peoples who now live there…Touareg, Fulani, Moor, Tubu…have origination myths that tell of ancestors who came from some other place, conquered the ‘primitive’ people they found living there, and set up home. The Sahara has been decisively Islamicised since at least the 10th century AD, but faint hints of earlier Pagan, Jewish and Christian migrations can be found in the language and customs of its modern inhabitants.

Most Saharan people are still nomads, although the sedentary way of life is gaining ground. Outsiders often confuse the concept of nomadism with a kind of primeval soul-searching. In fact it is a life born of necessity. A nomad will roam a fixed territory, moving his herd of camels, cattle or goats with the seasons and the rains from well to well, pasture to pasture. It is an extremely harsh existence but it brings with it a priceless independence and a deep bond between man and nature. A nomad needs little or nothing except what the land and sky around him freely provides. Most recent conflicts, like those between the French colonisers and various Touareg factions like the Kel Ahaggar, Kel Aïr and Ouellemeden, arose when the Touareg felt that their freedom and independence were threatened. The Touareg rebellion that broke out in the Adrar des Iforas region against the newly minted Malian state in 1963, and more recent rebellions in the early 1990s, also share the same root causes. Why must we pay taxes when God provides all we need? Why must we educate our children to read and write when neither of these skills will help them survive in the bush? Why do we need papers or passports to cross lands that our forefathers have roamed freely for centuries?

This sense of freedom is also the secret of the Sahara’s seductiveness. The desert and the nomads who inhabit it, embody so much of what was irrevocably lost in Europe and other ‘developed’ societies long long ago; space, simplicity, freedom, timelessness and the bond with nature. The epic immensity and undisturbed silence of its landscapes are the perfect antidote to bricked-up lives and the tyranny of the clock. Most newcomers sense the awesome pull of this freedom almost immediately. For the local, it is perhaps more subliminal, co-existing with hard and unremitting physical labour, corrupt officialdom, droughts, flash floods, atrocious roads and the occasional rebellion. Life in the desert is not easy, but it is both seductive and essential.

In terms of music and culture, the Sahara is like an inland sea, where the sounds, tastes and colours of peripheral ‘port’ cities like Marrakesh, Sijilmassa, Timbuktu, Agadez, Ghardaia, In Salah, Ghat, Ghadames, Tunis, Tripoli, Siwa, Cairo, Walata, Chinguetti, Djenné and Kano have mingled for centuries. This fact makes it a fascinating catalytic space whose role mirrors that of the Mediterranean Sea to the north. Over its immense rock-strewn wastes, the Arab and Berber cultures of the Maghreb have cross-faded with those of the Fulani, Songhai, Manding, Bambara, Wolof, Dinka and many more further south.

Our odyssey through the immense musical treasury of the Sahara starts in the far north west of the territory, in the huge oases of the Tafilalet, which nestles under the towering bony vertebrae of the Saharan Atlas range. It’s an area that gave birth to numerous quasi-religious dynasties that went on to conquer swathes of the Maghreb and southern Spain. The present Moroccan King, Mohammed VI, is a descendant of one such clan. It’s clear that the region is a source of immense musical riches too. The Compagnie Jellouli & Gdih come from Erfoud, the capital of the Tafilalet, and they play a style of music known as al baldi, in which the elegance of Andalusian melodies are coupled with the searing intensity of Berber music from the Atlas, and the harrowing lyricism of popular malhoun poetry. Centuries ago, the caravaniers that left the region to travel south to the salt mines of the Tanezrouft before crossing the Sahara to trade in their salt for an equal weight of gold in the bilad as soudani, ‘The Land of the Blacks’, must have had melodies such as this one swirling in their heads.

Moving over one thousand miles west by south-west we come to the Republic of Mauretania and one of its most remarkable up and coming young stars, Malouma Mint Meidah. Malouma has forged a name for herself as an innovative band leader and outspoken female voice in a country which has long been straight jacketed by fundamental Islamic mores and the dominance of old traditional musical castes. ‘Jraad’ is taken from her second album ‘Dunya’, which was recorded in the capital Nouakchott and released to global acclaim in 2003. It faithfully portrays her rebellious musical spirit, and her desire to incorporate jazz, blues, rock, soul together with the widest possible range of native Mauritanian sounds into a stunningly original new mix, thereby giving her fellow Mauritanians a bright new musical horizon.

The northeastern corner of Mali, a region known as the Adrar des Iforas, has been a cradle of dissent since independence in the early 1960s. In the 1970s and 1980s drought and oppression drove thousands of young Touareg, or ‘Kel Tamashek’ (The Tamashek speaking people) as they refer to themselves, into exile in Algeria and Libya. In military training camps set up by the opportunistic Colonel Khadafy, these young clandestinos learned how to fight, and in the early 1990s they returned home to launch a rebellion. Tinariwen were the pied pipers of this youthful movement of so-called ishumaren, or ‘unemployed’. Since the first Festival in the Desert, which took place near their hometown of Kidal in the Adrar in 2001, Tinariwen have toured the globe and the outside world has woken up to their searing skeletal brand of desert blues. However, ‘Alkhar Dessouf’, a mesmerically moody song about loss, nostalgia and love, illustrates the essential point about Tinariwen. They are first and foremost rebels of the soul, not the Kalashnikov, and their real battleground is the human heart.

The songs, rhythms and melodies of black African slaves and migrants and their descendants are a core element of modern North African music. In Morocco this heritage is sometimes called gnawa music, in Algeria it’s called diwan, or more specifically diwan de Bechar. Bechar is a dust blown town on the northern edge of the Sahara, made famous in colonial times by the antics of the Foreign Legionary garrison stationed there. It is now home to Hasna El Becharia, doyenne of the diwan style, and queen of the vibrant local wedding music scene. Hasna is virtuoso of the various Afro-Maghrebi instruments like the gut-string bass known as the guembri, or the metal castanets known as krakesh, and her jaunty tune ‘Hakmet Lakdar’ sums up her Afro-Berber-Arabic heritage very well.

Taking one of those huge geographical leaps that are obligatory in any brief overview of Saharan music, we end up in the southern Libyan oasis of Fezzan, whose links with the Mediterranean world date back to pre-Roman times. The territory has long been a battleground with Touareg and Arab nomads who have fought with the local black African Tubus for control. Chet Fewet are a powerful and youthful musical combo from the area, whose Arab-flavoured melodies are lent a rough, rootsy fire by the group’s own Touareg berber heritage.

It’s not only misinformed Europeans that have deemed the Sahara an empty place. Rapacious North African leaders have also used this widespread misconception to further their territorial ambitions. In 1975 King Hassan II of Morocco lead an army of soldiers and civilians into the vast deserts that line the Atlantic coast south of Morocco, which had previously been called ‘Rio d’Oro’ or ‘Spanish Sahara’. As far as he and his counsellors were concerned, this ‘empty’ territory was Morocco’s by historical and geographical right. The local Sahraoui people disagreed and their military arm, the Polisario, have been fighting for independence ever since. This bitter struggle has few silver linings, but one has been superlative canon of Sahraoui songs and recordings inspired by the conflict. Aziza Brahim, Nayim Alal and Mariem Hassan are all leading lights in this movement, and the raw uncompromising power of their music is self-evident.

Another group born out of struggle is Tartit Ensemble, let by the charismatic Fadimata ‘Disco’ Walet Oumar. Tartit, which means ‘union’, are all Touareg from the Kel Antessar tribe who have held sway in the deserts around the historic city of Timbuktu for centuries. During the Touareg rebellion of the early 1990s, Disco and many of her fellow Kel Antessar escaped to refugee camps in Mauretania. It was there that they founded a women’s music group in order to foster good spirits and strengthen cultural pride. With the help of friends and aid agencies they managed to tour Europe and have since become the world’s most famous ambassadors of traditional Touareg music. The group mostly comprises women, but it also includes a few men, including the singer Mohamed ag Abada, who performs with such haunting effect on the song ‘Ikruhuwaten’, which was recorded in the refugee camp in 1996. Tinariwen, Tartit and the Sahraoui musicians are all proof of the painful irony that while conflict and rebellion have had a cruel and devastating effect on desert peoples and their lives, they have also been the source of some of the greatest modern music to come out of the region.

The Songhai people have shared the southern fringes of the Sahara, along the banks of the Niger River, with the Touareg for centuries, and despite recent events, the two ethnicities have managed to live in harmony for most of that time. The city of Timbuktu and its environs have thrown up Songhai musicians of international repute like Ali Farka Touré and Afel Bocoum, but these names are only the tip of the proverbial iceberg. A local musical hero is the young Songhai singer Seckou Maiga, who has established himself as a serious contender after only three cassette releases. The cover of his 2002 release ‘Malfa Sibori’ depicts the Flame of Peace of 1996, a milestone event in which 3000 small arms, collected from combatants on both sides of the Touareg rebellion, were burned on a ritual pyre on the outskirts of Timbuktu. The Flame of Peace marked a definite end to hostilities and the beginning of a fragile peace which has so far managed to hold fast.

Another group who have helped to make the Timbuktu region a trove of musical, as well as historical treasures, are Kel Tin Lokiene. Lead by Hemi Ag Akreirou, this fifteen strong troupe delve deep into the funky yet diamond hard heart of traditional Touareg music. Their subject matter is often dominated by tales of old heroes and warriors, and the virtues of courage and chivalry that were apparently so much stronger in days of yore than now. Nostalgia for the past is an affliction felt as strongly in the Sahara as in Europe or anywhere else.

Agadez in northern Niger is a town that rivals Timbuktu in terms of historical and political importance. The presence of local uranium mines, made world famous by the hollow claims of President Bush and his entourage in the lead up to the second Gulf war, have also afforded the area increased wealth and notoriety. The nearby deserts of the Aïr and the immense Grand Erg du Ténéré possess some of the most beautiful and breath-taking scenery in the entire Sahara. Group Oyiwane are a local group lead by Balla ‘Barmo’ Kader, that have existed for two decades. Their music is based on the traditional rhythm of the tindé drum, which is itself based on the loping gait of the camel.

The Berber music of the northern desert fringes in Algeria is sometimes called Sahraoui, not to be confused with the people and music of the Western Sahara. Its core instrument is the rosewood desert flute or gasba, whose searing plaintive tones best describe the sound and mood of a forlorn desert wind blowing in from those interminable stony prairies. Sahraoui Bachir is one of the leading cheikhs, or improvising male poets and singers, of the genre. His vocal style is stark and powerful. It’s a sound that sums up the Sahara, in all its fearful, harsh yet seductive beauty.

The post The Rough Guide to the Music of the Sahara appeared first on Andy Morgan Writes.